BYE & SALE / PRIVATE PLACEMENT PROGRAM
: CASH IN BANK ACCOUNT / PROOF OF FUNDS / BANK GUARANTEE / THE
DEPOSITARY CERTIFICATE/
THE EXPORT CREDITS FOR
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
Since 1997 the
Federal Reserve
Board has been
obtaining data
on the issuance
of medium-term
notes (MTNs)
from the
Depository Trust
Company (DTC), a
national
clearinghouse
for the
settlement of
securities
trades and a
custodian for
securities. The
DTC performs
these functions
for almost all
activity in the
domestic market.
Before 1997, the
data was based
on surveys of
U.S.
corporations
that borrow in
the MTN market.
*
The MTN data
does not include
offerings by
foreign
corporations,
sovereigns, or
federal agencies
and whilst it
does include
MTNs offered by
bank holding
companies, it
excludes deposit
notes and bank
notes offered by
banks because
these securities
are exempt from
SEC registration
under section
3(a)2 of the
Securities Act
of 1933. The
Federal Reserve
collects this
data to improve
its estimates of
new securities
issues of U.S.
corporations as
published in the
Federal Reserve
Bulletin and to
improve
estimates of
corporate
securities
outstanding as
shown in the
Federal
Reserve's flow
of funds
accounts. The
Federal Reserve
regards the data
on individual
firms as
confidential.
*
The Study Group
carried out
extensive
discussions with
international
commercial and
investment banks
that are most
active in the
market for the
main new
financial
instruments. The
purposes were
both to improve
central-bank
knowledge of
those
instruments and
their markets as
the situation
existed in the
second half of
1985, and to
provide a
foundation for
considering
their
implications for
the stability
and functioning
of international
financial
institutions and
markets, for
monetary policy,
and for bank's
financial
reporting and
statistical
reporting of
international
financial
developments.
Alongside this
work, the Basle
Supervisor's
Committee has
undertaken a
study of the
report of the
prudential
aspects of
banking
innovations and
a report on the
management of
bank's
off-balance-sheet
exposures and
their
supervisory
implications was
published by
that Committee
in March 1986.
*
The growth of
these
instruments has
been enhanced by
two influences.
*
Firstly, bankers
have been
attracted to
off-balance-sheet
business because
of constraints
imposed on their
balance sheets,
notably
regulatory
pressure to
improve capital
rations, and
because they
offer a way to
improve the rate
of return earned
on assets.
*
Secondly, for
similar reasons,
banks have
sought ways to
hedge interest
rate risk
without
inflating
balance sheets,
as would occur
with the use of
the interbank
market.
[Extracts from
"Recent
Innovations in
International
Banking - April
1986" prepared
by a study group
established by
the Central
Banks of the
Group of Ten
Countries and
published by the
Bank for
International
Settlements.]
*
Why should such
an instrument be
issued?
To understand
the logic behind
the actual
mechanics of the
operation it is
necessary to
look at the way
in which a bank
usually
operates. The
bank's credit
rating and
status within
society is
judged by the
"size" of the
bank and its
capital/asset
ratio. The bank
lists its real
assets and its
cash position,
including
deposits,
securities,
etc., against
its loans,
debits and other
liabilities
showing a ration
of liquidity.
Each
jurisdiction of
the World
banking system
has different
minimum capital
adequacy
requirements
and, depending
on the status of
the individual
bank, the ratio
over assets
which the bank
can effectively
trade can be as
high as 20 times
the minimum
capital
requirement.
*
In simple terms
for every $100
held in
asset/capital
the bank can
lend or obligate
ate least $1,000
to other clients
or institutions
against the cash
on hand.
*
The money placed
on deposit by
the bank's
customers is
dealt with in a
different manner
to the actual
cash reserves or
assets of the
bank.
If the bank
disposes of an
asset, the
reluctant
capital is able
to be
"leveraged"
using the bank's
multiplier
ration, based on
the minimum
capital adequacy
requirements.
*
To bring all of
this into focus
and identify the
application of
these points to
the matter of
the question we
will now make
the following
overview:
*
A bank receives
an indication
from a client
that the client
is willing to
"buy" from the
bank a one year
obligation, zero
coupon, and
effectively
unsecured by any
of the physical
assets of the
bank, the credit
instrument is
based solely on
the "full faith
and credit
worthiness of
the bank".
*
Obviously the
format of the
credit
instrument must
be one which is
acceptable in an
jurisdiction and
freely
transferable,
able to be
settled at
maturity in
simple terms and
is without
restrictions
other than its
maturity
conditions. The
instrument which
immediately
comes to mind is
the Documentary
Letter of Credit
or Standby
Letter of
Credit.
*
Standby Letters
of Credit also
serve as
substitutes for
the simple or
first demand
guarantee. In
practice, the
Standby Letter
of Credit
functions almost
identically to
the first demand
guarantee. Under
both, the
beneficiary's
claim is made
payable on
demand and
without
independent
evidence of its
validity. The
two devices are
both security
devices issued
in transactions
not directly
involving the
sale of goods,
and they create
the same type of
problems.
[Extract from a
paper entitled
"Standby Letters
of Credit: Does
the Risk
outweigh the
Benefits?"
published in the
1988 Columbia
Business Law
Review.]
*
The blank piece
of bank paper
which is
technically as
asset of the
bank valued at
say 2 cents is
now "issued" and
the text added
in say "ten
million U.S.
Dollars face
value", signed
and sealed by
the authorised
bank officers.
The question now
is "what is the
piece of paper
worth?" Is it
worth 2 cents or
US$10 million,
bearing in mind
that it is
completely
unsecured by any
tangible or real
asset? In
reality it has a
"perceived value
of US$10
million" in 366
days time, based
upon the "full
faith and credit
of the bank".
The next
question which
now must be
asked is "will
the bank honour
its obligation
when the bank
note or credit
is presented"?
This will, of
course, depend
upon the
reputation and
credit
worthiness of
the issuer.
*
Having now
arrived at the
"belief" that
the "value" is
US$10 million in
366 days time,
the "Buzer" must
negotiate a
price, or
discount, which
is acceptable to
the Bank to
cause it to
"sell" the
credit.
*
To arrive at a
sale price one
has to determine
the accounting
ramifications of
the sale. The
liability is
US$10 million
payable "next
year", and it is
important to
note that the
reason for the
one year and one
day period is to
take the
liability into
the next
financial year,
no matter when
the credit is
issued. The
liability is
held "off
balance" sheet
and is
technically a
contingent
liability as it
is not based
upon any asset.
On the other
side of the
model, the bank
is to receive
cash from the
"sale of an
asset" and this
cash is
classified as
capital assets
which in turn
are subject to
the ratio
multiplier of
say 10 times.
*
So in real
terms, the
issuing bank is
to receive say
80% of the face
value upon sale
which is US$8
million cash on
hand against a
forward
liability of
US$10 million in
one year and one
day's time. The
actual
contingent
liability being
US$2 million.
The cash
received, US$8
million allows
the bank to lend
10 times this
amount under the
capital adequacy
rules, so US$80
million is able
to be lent on
balance sheet
against normal
securities such
as real estate,
etc. If the
interest rate is
say 8% simple
and the loans
are short term,
say one year, to
coincide with
the liability,
the income and
return (without
taking into
account the
principle sums
loaded) from
interest alone
is equal to
US$6,400,00.
*
At the end of
the year the
credit is due
for payment
against the cash
on hand and the
interest
received, in
other words,
US$8 million
plus
US$6,400,000
which total
US$14,500,000
less the US$10
million shows a
gross profit of
US$4,400,000 or
44% plus the
full value of
the loan amounts
(principle).
*
The reason for
issuing the
credit is now
obvious, the
resultant yield
is well over the
given discount
and the bank is
in a profitable
position without
risk. They have
achieved a
greater asset
yield than by
any conventional
means.
There is a
greater
underlying
reason which is
also indicated
if an overview
of the complete
supply system is
taken. To
simplify the
explanation, a
flow chart h as
been drawn which
shows the roles
of each entity
and the details
which are given
by an individual
who represented
the information
as direct from
the "Federal
Pool" which will
be outlined
herein.
*/
To understand
the system one
must take a view
which is not
supported by any
physical
evidence but is
indicated by the
actual
occurrences of
events.
*
As most people
are not aware,
the Federal
reserve Bank is
not a Federal
Government
entity or body,
it is in fact a
private
institution. It
may well operate
in a
quasi-government
manner but it is
still under the
control of
private
individuals.
*
If one assumes
that the money
supply
requirements for
a specific
period shows a
need to print,
say US$100
million of new
issue currency,
and the U.S.
Treasury is
required to
issue same, the
impact of the
release of those
"new" Dollars in
terms of
inflation and
market effect is
quite strong.
*
I, however, the
U.S. Treasury
through the
Federal Reserve
Bank was asked
to forward
"sell" those
Dollars for
"cash" the
amount of "new"
Dollars today is
reduced by
whatever amount
is being
yielded. If we
take the case in
question,
suppose the
Federal Reserve
Bank had
"contracted"
with a major
world bank to
"issue" Dollar
denominated one
year paper in
the amount of
US$100 million
and "sold" this
paper through a
secure network
of entities so
that the "sale"
did not appear
"on market" and
that the "sale"
was at a
discount of say
80% of face
value. The cash
yield back to
the U.S.
Treasury would
be US$80 million
against a Dollar
credit of same
amount to the
issuing bank,
with the bank
taking a US$100
million
liability
position at
maturity date.
*
The U.S.
Treasury has now
received US$80
million in cash
back in from the
market/system
and need only
print US$20
million to meet
its current
obligation to
the money
supply. This is
20% of the
original amount
and, as such,
its impact on
the system is
greatly reduced.
Of course, if
the amount
"sold" is
greater than the
money supply
requirement, the
U.S. Treasury
has a reduction
which allows
lower interest
rates to be
maintained
and/or
controlled.
*
The long term
position is not
affected as the
bank has taken
on the liability
not the U.S.
Government, the
Dollar credit is
classed as
"cash" for the
purpose of
capital adequacy
and is not
required to be
physically
"printed" as
such, a simple
ledger entry is
sufficient.
The off market
issue and sale
of bank credit
instruments is
controlled by
simple supply
and demand
techniques, and
all U.S. Dollar
denominated
paper is
"issued" through
the Federal
Reserve Bank.
*
To do this, the
Federal Reserve
Bank enters into
an understanding
with the U.S.
Treasury and the
top 100 world
banks, excluding
state operated
banks, American
Banks (with the
exception of
Morgan
Guaranty), Third
World banks and
any other banks
which may have a
capital/credit
problem. The
current list
(Based upon the
January 1992
Bankers Almanac)
totals some 62
banks.
*
Each bank agrees
to allow the
Federal Reserve
Bank to issue,
on its behalf, a
specific amount
of U.S. Dollar
denominated
paper or the
alternative
applies where
the Federal
Reserve Bank
allocates a
specific amount
to each bank.
The details are
not published
and no physical
evidence has
been made
available to the
author. In any
case, the result
is that a
specific volume
is available and
the Federal
Reserve Bank is
now able to
release it on
demand.
*
The various bank
paper is
"pooled"
together to give
the total
position for
each year, and
it is from the
"Federal Pool"
that the supply
contracts are
issued. The
existence of the
"Federal Pool"
is not
confirmed.
However, various
documents
including GNMA
transfer
documents
contain a "Pool
Number".
*
The "collateral
contracts" which
one hears about,
are effectively
issued by the
Federal Pool. It
is indicated
that these are
usually issued
in US$500
million units,
with each
minimum
denomination
being US$100
million. In
other words, the
minimum order is
US$500 million
in US$100
million
tranches, it has
been indicated
that the "cost"
or deposit for
one of these
contracts is
US$100 million
cash. This
obviously
reduces the
number of
entities who are
able to
participate.
*
One point which
should be raised
at this time,
although the
market place and
issue of these
instruments is
"unregulated",
the banks are
effectively
controlled by
the B.I.S. and
self imposed
rules. Otherwise
the whole system
would be subject
to possible
manipulation and
abuse by a bank,
or group of
banks, entering
into a form of
"insider
trading", this
would be
detrimental to
the system and
the long term
effect of same.
*
The entities who
are the holders
of the
"collateral
contracts" are
commonly
referred to as
"cutting
houses", as they
usually reduce
the side of the
denomination
from US$100
million to as
little as US$10
million. They in
fact "cut down
the size of the
note" hence
"cutting house".
*
The cutting
houses then in
turn "sell"
delivery
commitments to
wholesale
brokers, the
cost of such is
indicated at
approximately
US$10.0 million
cash.
*
In both cases
the cash payment
or deposit is
able to be
called upon if
an order is not
met or paid for
on time, and if
called for the
contract holder
would lose his
contract and
would be
"blacklisted" in
the system to
prevent any new
contract
position. The
rules are very
simple, cash
payment at all
times for all
notes ordered,
this is a cash
driven industry
not credit.
*
It is assumed by
the author that
each cutting
house would
normally issue
say 50 delivery
commitments or
"sub master
commitments" at
US$2.5 million
each. Therefore,
their deposit of
US$100 million
is now covered
plus a reserve
of US$25
million. This is
very similar to
the normal
activities of
pos betting
where the odds
are "laid off"
to restrict
exposure.
*
The wholesale
brokers are
responsible to
feed the volume
of instruments
to the clients
or customers who
are at the
retail or retail
distribution
level and,
subsequently, to
the secondary
market.
*
The issuing
banks can be
identified as
the
manufacturers of
this product, in
this cast the
product is bank
paper. The
Federal Reserve
Bank can be
identified as
the importer
(80%). The
Federal Pool can
be identified as
the storage
depot (82.5%)
for all the
product prior to
sale and are
responsible for
the bulk release
to the regional
distributors.
The cutting
houses can be
identified as
the regional
distributors
(85%) and are
responsible for
the release of
units to the
local
distributor. The
wholesale
brokers can be
identified as
the local
wholesaler
(87.5%) who
release units on
demand to the
retail
showrooms. The
primary clients
can be
identified as
the retail
showroom (89%)
who deliver the
units to the
public buyers.
The public buyer
exists in the
secondary market
(92 - 94%), such
as pension
funds, Middle
East (Muslim)
clients banks
(to buy on the
secondary market
is not classed
as contrary to
the rule). They
hold the
instruments
until maturity
and gain the
preferred yield
from the
discount against
the face value
(100%) from the
issuing banks.
The biggest
problem
encountered by
the author
regarding this
matter is the
contradictory
and somewhat
unusual attitude
of the banks
when any attempt
is made to
obtain any
definitive
documents or
undertakings.
The very
existence of
these
instruments has
been denied, at
senior level by
bank officials,
and yet, within
the same bank,
requests to
purchase said
instruments have
been received by
the author.
*
Also the
regulatory
position of
these
instruments
creates a major
problem for any
regulated entity
to participate.
How can an
unregulated item
be handled by a
regulated body!
*
It is the
opinion or the
author, based on
all the
information
available that
the main reason
for most of the
mystery and
misinformation
is quite simple,
this is a
sophisticated
form of
financial
engineering, it
makes normal
accounting
principles a
complete mockery
and basically
exposes the
banking system
for what it is.
*
In reality, the
whole system is
flawed and is
one which no one
really
understands, we
based our daily
life on a "paper
house". Nothing
has really
changed since
the very first
"money"
transactions or
even earlier,
"I'll swap you
two blue shells
for three red
shells and I'll
give you three
red shells for
your XYZ goods".
The whole
monetary system
is based on
"perceived
value" including
currencies,
credit, and day
to day life.
*
A bank note
issued by the
Bank of England
is in reality an
unsecured
"Promissory
Note" payable
and demand. Its
face value is
its perceived
value, however,
if the word
demand were
changed to a
future date, of
say one year and
one day, the
perceived value
has now been
reduced to cover
the "cost of
money" for the
period.
*
If we were to
discuss the
value of one
single £50.00
note, the
"value" today
would be
approximately
$45.00 However,
if we wished to
"discount the
present value"
several million
of these notes,
it is reasonable
to expect that
the "wholesale"
buyer would
expect a better
"price". The
note, however,
still has a
"perceived
value" of £50.00
and a present
value of
approximately
£45.00
Very little
"cash" is used
in the day to
day operation of
business, mostly
it is in the
form of ledger
or "paper"
entries. Even
when a private
bank account is
used, most of
all transactions
are "paper"
driven not cash.
A cheque is a
"Promissory
Note", either
unsecured or
guaranteed by
the bank up to a
certain limit (cheque
guarantee card).
If a bank draft
is "purchased"
the draft is
still unsecured
but is perceived
to be a 100%
guarantee of
payment.
*
The current
trend towards
"plastic" and
"electronic
banking" is an
indication of
the future and
is based purely
upon the amount
of business
which takes
place daily. The
banks can no
longer cope with
physical "paper"
and need to
reduce each
transaction to a
simple ledger
entry. The end
result is less
"money" and more
"business".
*
The use of these
instruments as a
medium for short
term investment
is obvious, if
one takes the
differential
between the
"invoice" price
and the "present
value" and moves
a client into
and out of the
instruments on a
regular basis,
the effective
yield is
substantial.
The downside
risk is nil, if
one retains
strict protocol
over the
potential
purchases, with
a worse case
scenario of the
fact that a
client would
either NOT
transact and
therefore not be
at risk. If an
instrument had
been purchased
and for whatever
reason could not
be onwards "sold
or discounted",
the client would
automatically
achieve a
substantial
yield based on
the maturity
value against
the "invoice
paper".
The preceding
information is
considered
confidential and
is not to be
copied.